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ABSTRACT
Donald Davidson has deeply contributed to what is nowadays 
called Externalism. However, the exact formulation of his 
externalism is not obvious since his externalist commitments 
are spread along many of his papers. The aim of this work is 
to explore the details of his externalism. We will point out that 
Davidson clearly defends that the mind is not self-contained. 
Nonetheless, this idea acquires at least two different senses 
under his view: on the one hand, mental states and contents 
must be individuated in part by factors external to one’s skin 
because the former were caused by the latter; and on the other 
hand, mental states and contents must be individuated in part by 
external factors because the mind is constituted by knowledge. 
We will point out that the apparently harmonious relation 
between those two levels of explanation turn out to be conflictive 
at a certain point within the very Davidsonian program. 
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interpretation, mental causation, triangulation.
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EXTERNISMO DE DAVIDSON
cristina Borgoni y  herivelto soUza
RESUMEN
Donald Davidson ha tenido un papel extremamente 
importante en lo que hoy se llama Externismo. Sin embargo, 
la formulación exacta de su externismo no es obvia porque 
sus compromisos están dispersos a lo largo de muchos de 
sus artículos. El objetivo de este trabajo es explorar los 
detalles de su externismo. Indicaremos que Davidson, sin 
duda defiende, que la mente no está auto-contenida. No 
obstante, tal idea tiene por lo menos dos sentidos distintos en 
su trabajo: por un lado, estados y contenidos mentales deben 
ser individuados, en parte, respecto a factores externos a la 
piel de uno, porque fueron causados por ellos; y por otro 
lado, estados y contenidos mentales deben ser individuados 
por factores externos porque la mente está constituida por 
conocimiento. Indicaremos que la relación entre estos dos 
niveles explicativos, aparentemente armoniosa, se vuelve 
conflictiva dentro del mismo programa davidsoniano. 
Palabras clave: Donald Davidson, externismo, interpretación 
radical, causación mental, triangulación.
Introduction
donald davidson has deePly contriBUted to what is nowadays called 
Externalism, a philosophical position about the mind, which has its most 
refereed roots in Hilary Putnam’s (1975) and Tyler Burge’s (1979) papers. 
In several of his works, Davidson has stressed that the mind is not self-
contained, that it is not independent of the world. He suggests indeed that 
the mind turns out to be unintelligible within an internalist framework. 
However, the exact location of his externalism is not obvious since the 
theses which compose it are spread along many papers.
The aim of this work is to pursue such a location through indicating the 
externalist theses which Davidson is committed to. We will point out that 
Davidson clearly defends the externality of the mind. Nevertheless, such 
an externality gains at least two different senses or explanations under his 
view, which could serve to characterize two different ways of motivating 
externalism. We will be especially interested in characterizing the relation 
between both kinds of “externalisms”.
We begin by raising a sort of conflict between Davidson’s thought 
experiment of Swampman and his theses about language and radical 
interpretation. Such an experiment asks us to imagine a creature, 
Swampman, which is interpreted by others and seems to interpret them 
though it misses a mind. Davidson’s arguments involved in his theory of 
interpretation and in his denial of the third dogma of empiricism preclude 
him to conceive such a creature. Departing from this conflict, we intend 
to trace a route along some of Davidsonian theories and theses in order to 
delineate his externalism.
First, we will discuss the Davidsonian idea of triangulation understood 
as the requirement of causal connections between the individual, her 
community and the world in order for the mind to emerge. We will then 
introduce his view about linguistic practices as being the very proof of 
the idea of triangulation. Once we are interpreters and are interpreted, and 
as long as we ascribe beliefs and meanings mutually to each other, the 
fundamental connections between ourselves, the community and the world 
must have been already established, for there is no sense in talking about 
mind and about mental contents in the absence of any of the vertexes.
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Our next step will be to examine his denial of the so called third 
dogma of empiricism, the distinction between conceptual scheme and 
content. With this movement, Davidson is able to conclude that the mind 
cannot be detached from the world, in the sense that we are knowers. Such 
a position stresses once more the compulsory role of the community as 
well the compulsory involvement of the world. The reasons that sustain 
such a denial, however, respond to his theses about radical interpretation, 
which will be discussed in the subsequent section.
In the sixth section, we will propose two senses by which we can 
understand Davidson’s externalism: on the one hand, mental states and 
contents must be individuated in part by factors external to one’s skin 
because the latter were caused by the former; on the other hand, mental 
states and contents must be individuated in part by external factors to one’s 
skin because the mind is constituted by knowledge. Those two senses will 
correspond to two levels of explication about the externality of the mind.
In the conclusive section we will raise a question about what could 
prevent us from accepting Swampman as an open possibility within 
Davidson’s externalism. We will offer an overall view about Davidson’s 
theory of anomalous monism, which seems to be in agreement with the 
scenario where Swampman is created. We will try to defend that nothing 
intrinsic to such a discourse poses any problem to the viability of a creature 
such as Swampman. And so we will be back to the tension initially indicated 
by the paper. 
1. 
let’s sUPPose dUring one of donald davidson’s stays in England, he 
decides to give himself a break and go for a cruise along Thames Estuary, 
located in a swampland area. While he is waiting for his boat it starts to 
rain and, suddenly, lightning strikes a dead three besides him. Entirely by 
coincidence, Davidson’s body is reduced to the tree elements and the tree 
turns into Davidson’s physical replica. This replica, Swampman, moves 
exactly as Davidson used to do. He gets into the boat, appears to enjoy the 
trip and go back to London, where he was giving a series of philosophical 
interviews. Swampman seems to recognize Davidson’s friends, appears to 
return their questions in English and seems to manage all philosophical 
theses Davidson used to sustain. No one could tell the difference.
Universitas PhilosoPhica, año 26, 53 dic 2009:seccion
5davidson’s externalisms
But, there is a difference. My replica [Davidson says] can’t recognize my 
friends; it can’t recognize anything, since it never cognized anything in 
the first place. It can’t know my friends’ names (though of course it seems 
to) […]. It can’t mean what I do by the word ‘house’, for example, since 
the sound ‘house’ Swampman makes was not learned in a context that 
would give it the right meaning – or any meaning at all. Indeed, I don’t 
see how my replica can be said to mean anything by the sounds it makes, 
nor to have any thoughts (Davidson, 1987: 19). 
In other words, Swampman has no mind. Davidson’s mental states 
have a causal history while Swampman hasn’t any, since it appeared only 
a few minutes ago. According to such an experiment, despite Swampman 
being interpretable and seeming to be able to interpret others, it is a thing, 
it has no mind.
But then, one could recall the theses involved in the theory of 
interpretation and the denial of the third dogma of empiricism advanced 
by Davidson. In those contexts, Davidson argues against the very idea 
of alternative conceptual schemes. He argues that once we recognize a 
conceptual scheme, that is, when we recognize someone as a linguistic 
being, we are already sharing most of our beliefs with such a person. He 
sustains that “given the underlying methodology of interpretation, we could 
not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically 
different from our own” (Davidson, 1974: 197).
Such a methodology of interpretation involves, on the one 
hand, the interdependence between belief and meaning because, for 
Davidson, the attribution of beliefs and the interpretation of sentences 
occur at once. On the other hand, it requires the assumption of a general 
agreement between interpreter’s and speaker’s beliefs in addition to the 
assumption of a great deal of correctness about the speaker’s beliefs 
(Davidson, 1974: 195-196).
When we interpret someone, Davidson sustains, we need to keep 
some things stable. In an extreme case of radical interpretation, the linguist 
wouldn’t be able to give even a first step towards translation if she doubted 
simultaneously the meaning of the utterance Gavagai, the native’s accuracy 
when he says Gavagai, and the nature of the sound as constituting a linguistic 
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behaviour1. According to Davidson, even an ordinary conversation requires 
keeping something fixed. In order to interpret a sound as intentional, we 
must suppose that there is someone who intends to say something; that 
we are dealing with a minded individual. In such a situation, to doubt the 
mindedness of the creature seems to be blocked.
The Swampman case, however, seems to open the way to turn 
alternative conceptual schemes intelligible. It is an example of a completely 
empty scheme with which any other subject would share no beliefs. In 
that scenario anyone who interprets Swampman is wrong, since there is 
nobody to be interpreted. This certainly highlights an important tension 
within Davidson’s framework because in many of his writings, Davidson 
holds that the mind exists inasmuch as it is attributed, and it is attributed 
inasmuch as it in fact exists.
This may be one of the reasons why Davidson has regretted, in so 
many passages, the use of such “science fictions” in order to delineate 
his philosophical positions. And such an idea is our starting point: if the 
case for externalism can be made with Swampman, it can be even better 
made without2.
2.
it seems that if we want to Understand Davidson’s externalism, it would be 
more appropriated not to depart from the Swampman case, since it represents 
-to say the least- a case of total failure of translatability, what is precisely 
denied by Davidson in several works. Nevertheless, we could retain some 
of the theses that surround Davidson’s thought experiment in order to reach 
his externalist commitments, such as the idea that mental states and contents 
must be individuated appealing to external factors, because the former are 
caused by the latter. What is more, the external character of the mental 
involves all the history of such connections instead of isolated events, as 
1 We will discuss Quine’s example in more detail in section 5.
2 We are following Davidson’s own observations about his thought experiments such as 
“I also agree […] that the argument that summons up an Omniscient Interpreter does not 
advance my case. As with Swampman, I regret these sorties into science fiction and what 
a number of critics have taken to be theology. If the case can be made with an omniscient 
interpreter, it can be made without and better” (Davidson, 1999a: 192).
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supposed by Putnam. According to Davidson, such a change in his approach 
supports the denial of mental’s division between broad and narrow contents, 
and consequently allows the spread of externalism to the mind as a whole.
The classical Twin Earth experiment offers a situation where Oscar1 
and Oscar2 use the same word with different meaning in spite of their 
inability to access the “true” meaning of their terms. From this case, Putnam 
concludes that psychological states don’t determine the extension of the 
terms. Davidson’s criticism towards him indicates that Putnam could have 
lead externalism much further than he actually did. Davidson highlights 
that the difference between Oscar1 and Oscar2’s causal history precludes 
us from considering them as being in the same psychological states.
Putnam’s route towards externalism begins with his diagnosis of a bad 
philosophical tradition that has insisted in sustaining simultaneously the 
following assumptions:
(I) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in certain 
psychological state [...]
(II) That the meaning of a term (in the sense of ‘intension’) determines 
its extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of 
extension) (Putnam, 1975: 219). 
Putnam’s externalism emerges from the denial of (I), which charges him 
with the burden of keeping the correspondent psychological states as narrow 
ones. Davidson insists that the sort of paradox pointed out by Putnam takes 
place only when we depart from an internalist view about psychological 
states. The broadening of externalism conducted by Davidson covers not 
only meanings, but psychological states in general as well.
When Davidson sustains that the causal history of our terms is what 
should count for the individuation and the determination of mental contents, 
he is able to maintain that Oscar1 and Oscar2’s minds should be distinct in 
all aspects, including those states that supposedly provide material for self-
knowledge. According to Davidson, “it doesn’t follow, simply from the 
fact that meanings are identified in part by relations to objects outside the 
head, that meanings aren’t in the head” (Davidson, 1987: 31) in the sense 
that the subject wouldn’t know his own thoughts if they were individuated 
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in an external manner. Davidson states that “to suppose this would be as 
bad as to argue that because my being sunburned presupposes the existence 
of the sun, my sunburn isn’t a condition of my skin” (Davidson, 1987: 
31). Two burned skins could be visually indistinguishable, but if one of 
them was caused by the sun and the other not, we should take into account 
such external factors in order to individuate both injuries. One is a case of 
sunburn while the other is not.
3.
the teacher is resPonding to two things: the external situation and the 
responses of the learner. The learner is responding to two things: the 
external situation and the responses of the teacher. All these relations are 
causal. Thus the essential triangle is formed which makes communication 
about shared objects and events possible. But it is also this triangle that 
determines the content of the learner’s words and thoughts when these 
become complex enough to deserve the term (Davidson, 1990: 203).
The ideas exposed in (2) acquire a better application when understood 
under the perspective of Davidson’s notion of triangulation. There can be 
no mind without any of the vertexes that form the triangle: the individual, 
the community and the physical world. Since these three factors constitute 
enabling conditions for the emergence of thought, and since they contribute 
to determining its contents, the causal relations between those vertexes 
must be taken into account for the individuation of mental states and events.
However, the triangulation story is neither so brief, nor reduced to the 
talk about causal relations in isolation. Davidson’s view about interpretation 
is reflected here once more. He sustains that our linguistic life is the very 
proof of the idea of triangulation. Once we interpret and are interpreted, 
that is, as long as we ascribe beliefs and meanings mutually to each other, 
the fundamental connections between ourselves, the community and the 
world must have already been established.
Davidson insists on the fact that the distinctive aspect of his concept 
of triangulation, as a tool to indicate necessary (although not sufficient) 
conditions for thought and talk, is the introduction of the community 
pole. Since triangulation can be taken also as a sort of sketch of language 
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acquisition3, the second individual that stands for community does the 
important job of helping to identify the relevant cause of an utterance in a 
given situation. Quine had already shown that it was not sufficient for the 
learner to hear a sentence in the presence of an object in order to grasp its 
meaning: it is essential that the learner sees that the teacher also sees the 
object (Quine, 1969: 28). The problem, Davidson argues, is that Quine’s 
“epistemology remains resolutely individualistic” (Davidson, 2001: 10), 
for he has always insisted on the role of sensory stimulation (the triggering 
of nerve endings) as the only clue to the meaning of an observational 
sentence. But who knows something about the patterns of stimulation of 
another person? In contrast, Davidson noticed early that the option for the 
distal cause of the stimulus was the only that could serve that purpose. 
That’s why Davidson defends that
Our triangular model thus makes a step toward dealing with another 
troublesome feature of Burge’s perceptual externalism, the indeterminate 
nature of the contents of perceptual beliefs. That difficulty arose because 
there seemed to be no way to decide the location of the objects and 
features of the world that constitute the subject matter of perceptual 
beliefs; Burge told us only that the content was given by the ‘usual’ 
or ‘normal’ cause. But this did not help choose between proximal and 
distal stimuli, or anything in between, in the causal chain. By introducing 
a second perceiver, it is possible to locate the relevant cause: it is the 
cause common to both creatures, the cause that prompts their distinctive 
responses (Davidson, 2001: 8-9).
In order to manage that, Davidson seems to suggest that individuals 
have some kind of natural ability4 to associate another creature’s responses 
to features of the shared world that possibly have caused such responses. 
“We are built to discriminate objects, to keep track of them, expect them 
3 As in Quine, for whom the radical translation situation was analogous to the coming of 
a child into the language practices of a community, the Davidsonian triangulation can be 
considered as a description of what is in play in radical interpretation as well as a structure 
of the elements involved in the process of language learning.
4 In fact, one way to conceive this is supposing that such abilities have emerged as result 
of processes like natural selection. What is important, anyway, is to identify factors that are 
necessary to make intelligible how thought could ever come out, and this kind of ability 
was certainly in play there.
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to emerge from their hole or from behind trees, and in some cases to feed 
or eat us”, says Davidson (1999b: 731). But then, once one gets mastery 
on concept use, and so becomes able to propositional thought, Davidson 
suggests that “Perception is propositional: when we look or feel or hear 
we believe. What we are caused by our senses to believe is often true, 
which in the simplest cases it could not fail to be, since the content of 
our simplest beliefs is necessarily fixed by the history of past perceiving” 
(Davidson, 1999b: 732).
So, this makes clear that, according to Davidson, an individual 
wouldn’t have thoughts without having language, which has a social 
basis in the sense that “without one creature to observe another, the 
triangulation that locates the relevant objects in a public space could not 
take place” (Davidson, 1990: 202). Such a social life, which is needed 
for having a mind, also requires a good deal of actual knowledge, not 
only of features of the objectively common environment, but of other 
people’s minds as well. The external aspect of the mind is explicated, 
on the one hand, by the requirement of relations between oneself, her 
community and the world, and on the other hand, by the mind’s being 
constituted by knowledge. It seems that if causal relations between 
the three vertexes of the triangle are enabling conditions for the 
mind, the presence of knowledge is another important requirement in 
Davidson’s account.
4.
that the mind cannot Be detached from the world, in the sense that we 
are knowers, is a conclusion reached by Davidson when he rejects the 
so called third dogma of empiricism, the distinction between conceptual 
scheme and content.
Davidson accuses such a dualism to be committed to the idea that our 
cognitive and linguistic abilities are organizing activities of a brute material 
offered by the world through experience. “Conceptual schemes, we are told, 
are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give 
form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, 
cultures, or periods survey the passing scene” (Davidson, 1974: 183). 
According to him, this image is all one needs to conceive different conceptual 
schemes, different systems of concepts that could be untranslatable to one 
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another, even though sharing the very same objective world. In such a 
scenario, “Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one 
system may not in another” (Davidson, 1974: 183).
When Davidson refuses the dualism between scheme and content, he 
undermines the possibility of isolating conceptual form from empirical 
content, as well as distinguishing between supposed radically different 
conceptual schemes. His reasons respond basically to the unintelligibility 
of the idea of relative or alternative conceptual schemes:
For what is the common reference point, or system of coordinates, to 
which each scheme is relative? Without a good answer to this question, 
the claim that each of us in some sense inhabits his own world loses 
its intelligibility. […] The meaninglessness of the idea of a conceptual 
scheme forever beyond our grasp is due not to our inability to understand 
such a scheme, nor to our other human limitations; it is due simply to 
what we mean by a system of concepts (Davidson, 1988:39-40).
So, a system of concepts cannot be systematically separated from the 
world in which it was formed. The Davidsonian attack on the third dogma, 
then, has a double movement: “one of them criticizes the separation of 
concepts and naked sensations. The second rejects the divorce between 
world-views or schemes and the universe” (Pinedo, 2004: 271).
According to Davidson, when Quine (1951) denounced the two first 
dogmas, he banned the image of several worlds seeing, heard or described 
from the same point of view, a conception of world-views that could 
dispense with the contribution of the world itself. With this move, Quine 
provides a kind of warranted contact to the world by concluding that the 
total knowledge system of a given community gets affected by the world 
through experience, at least at its periphery. Nevertheless, Davidson argues 
that the rejection of the two dogmas doesn’t prevent us from imagining a 
single world seen and described from different points of view that would 
also be untranslatable one into another5.
5 That is, there can always be a translation between conceptual schemes, in Quine’s view, 
but there is a constitutive indetermination in any translation, which keeps the specter of 
systematic mistake, or insuperable incommensurability, haunting us. That’s why we can say 
they might be untranslatable.
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The rejection of the third dogma is specifically directed towards such 
a kind of relativism, since even abandoning the two dogmas, as suggested 
by Quine, we still do not rule out the idea that a community could change 
completely the standards of its system of beliefs to the point of creating 
untranslatable conceptual schemes. 
Renouncing the third dogma, as suggested by Davidson, also provides 
a sort of warranted contact with the world, but dispenses with any reference 
to experience; at least as empiricists conceive it, as having a primary role. 
Davidson defends that anything that deserves the name of world-view 
is inseparable from the world that is viewed, and this is enough for one 
not to require any empiricist explanation of such a contact. The mind is 
conceivable only as being constituted in the presence of the world.
Given the dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality, we get conceptual 
relativity, and truth relative to a scheme. Without the dogma, this kind of 
relativity goes by the board. Of course truth of sentences remains relative 
to language, but that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism 
of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish 
unmediated touch with familiar objects whose antics make our sentences 
and opinions true or false (Davidson, 1974: 198).
The denial of the dualism between concepts and naked sensations means 
that only within a conceptual environment –within a linguistic community– 
one could individuate mental contents. According to Davidson, once the 
third dogma is rejected, there are no reasons to maintain empiricism. The 
well known Davidsonian slogan “only beliefs justify beliefs” (Davidson, 
1983) stresses the idea that any possibility of content’s individuation is 
carried out by pertaining to a community, and that precludes any appeal to 
a privileged moment when the world reveals itself barely, as in the Quinean 
tribunal of experience.
The second important result of rejecting the third dogma is the 
abandonment of the divorce between world-views and the world itself. 
Such a conclusion is made apparent when Davidson states that once there 
is something that suggests the existence of a conceptual scheme, such as 
a language or a linguistic community, “world content” is already there. 
Whatever we identify as being “our world vision” cannot be completely 
isolated from other “world-views”, nor from the world itself.
Universitas PhilosoPhica, año 26, 53 dic 2009:seccion
13davidson’s externalisms
In this sense, the rejection of the third dogma turns compulsory 
the role of a community as well as the participation of the world. There 
are not several possibilities of organizing the supposed brute material 
offered by the world, all untranslatable between each other. The world 
itself must be present in our actual understanding activities, even if we 
don’t have absolute warrants about which part of our belief systems is 
more accurate than others.
5.
the comPUlsory ParticiPation of Both the world and the community 
sustaining the talk about mental contents is a conclusion afforded by 
Davidson’s account on radical interpretation.
Quine (1960) asks us to imagine a case of a community completely 
isolated from any other on earth and, in addition, a linguist who goes to 
such a community in order to elaborate a translation manual. The linguist 
observes numerous situations, for example, one where a rabbit runs in 
front of them and the natives say “Gavagai”. The linguist takes note of this 
verbal behaviour and translates it as “rabbit”.
Quine stresses that such a translation hypothesis will be tested in 
similar future circumstances in order to corroborate the linkage between 
the stimulus and the verbal behaviour. In addition, given the plurality of 
stimuli that could have provoked such an emission of sound, the hypothesis 
at hand will be put under the approval of someone from the community. 
In that case, the linguist should be able to perceive the native’s assent or 
dissent in front of the question “Gavagai?”. Given the complexity of this 
whole situation, Quine concludes that the indetermination of translation 
should be the case. Mistakes and failures could be managed or diminished, 
but the method of translation should be considered in fact as inconclusive 
if our aim was the search for synonymies.
Nevertheless, Davidson considers that the situation proposed by 
Quine has many other features that should receive more of our attention. 
According to Davidson, the very activity of the linguist in such a 
community –taken at first as having a completely different conceptual 
scheme– would require the satisfaction of some important conditions, 
such as the linguist’s ability for perceiving what could count as being 
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verbal behaviour. Davidson emphasises that to perceive something as a 
conceptual scheme isn’t given to us at all. Perceiving some behaviour 
as a contentful linguistic one puts us automatically in a comprehensive 
position of such a conceptual system, in the sense that it cannot be 
completely isolated from our own:
Radical interpretation establishes that something meaningful cannot be 
understood in isolation from other meaningful things, but rather globally: 
when we make sense of someone’s speech or rationalize her behaviour 
we need to assume a shared world which is inconceivable independently 
of a shared intentional net. Davidson dedicates to this idea one of his 
most subtle arguments: his rejection of the third dogma of empiricism 
(Pinedo, 2006: 11).
In the absence of such a shared net of beliefs, one couldn’t even 
recognize verbal behaviours as meaningful assertions in the so considered 
isolated community. One couldn’t recognize such a community as 
a linguistic one. That is the key of the Davidsonian insistence in the 
interdependency between meanings and beliefs.
The attribution of beliefs and the interpretation of someone’s 
words occur simultaneously, as aspects of the same practice. That is 
why Davidson maintains that someone’s speech cannot be interpreted 
unless a good part of what the speaker’s beliefs are about is known by 
the interpreter. The elaboration of a translating manual doesn’t require 
only a good match between native words and ours. It is an activity not 
only of translating other’s language into ours, it involves the description 
of other’s attitudes as well (Davidson, 1974: 186). And to describe 
someone’s attitudes is an activity of ascription of mental states, such as 
beliefs and desires. 
Davidson sustains that the basis of our interpretation activities 
is the sharing of beliefs and, in addition, it requires from us the 
attribution of correctness to the person we are interpreting. The 
extreme situation of radical interpretation stresses the myriad of 
mistakes the linguist is subject to. She could be wrong about her 
choice of translation and the native could be wrong in using a term 
of his own language. However, Davidson insists, interpretation is 
only possible if we don’t take into account all the possibilities of 
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mistake involved in any situation. Because of this, Davidson defends 
that we need to ascribe a great deal of success to our interpretee6, a 
condition known as the principle of charity:
Since charity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable 
theory, it is meaningless to suggest that we might fall into massive error 
by endorsing it. (...) Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if 
we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters 
(Davidson, 1974: 197).
The method is not designed to eliminate disagreement, nor can it; its 
purpose is to make meaningful disagreement possible, and this depends 
entirely on a foundation – some foundation – in agreement. The agreement 
may take the form of widespread sharing of sentences held true by 
speakers of ‘the same language’, or agreement in the large mediated by a 
theory of truth contrived by an interpreter for speakers of another language 
(Davidson, 1974: 196-197).
We have seen that sharing beliefs constitutes an enabling condition 
for interpretation. We have also seen that such an idea gives place to the 
rejection of a solipsistic isolation between different conceptual schemes. 
The so called “relative world views” cannot be enclosed within themselves. 
Following this same line of reasoning, we could also say that Davidson 
provides us with means to reject the idea of a speaking individual isolated 
inside her own world. Given that the conditions for radical interpretation 
apply to foreign situations as well as to domestic ones, we are able to state 
the impossibility of one’s own isolation from every other individual. There 
is no sense in talking about private worlds.
Besides sharing beliefs and attributing truth to other’s beliefs in order 
to interpret them, Davidson defends that radical interpretation requires that 
a great deal of those beliefs must be indeed true. This fact turns knowledge 
as another enabling condition for interpretation, an important one which by 
itself prevents us from being isolated from the world. Davidson defends that:
6 This does not mean we have to ascribe success in all situations, but that the ascription of 
error is intelligible only against the background of massive success.
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Until a base line has been established by communication with someone 
else, there is no point in saying one’s own thoughts or words have 
a propositional content. If this is so, then it is clear that knowledge of 
another mind is essential to all thought and all knowledge. Knowledge 
of another mind is possible, however, only if one has knowledge of the 
world, for the triangulation which is essential to thought requires that 
those in communication recognize that they occupy positions in a shared 
world. So knowledge of other minds and knowledge of the world are 
mutually dependent: neither is possible without the other. […]
Knowledge of the propositional contents of our minds is not possible 
without the other forms of knowledge since there is no propositional 
thought without communication. It is also the case that we are not in a 
position to attribute thoughts to others unless we know what we think 
since attributing thoughts to others is a matter of matching the verbal 
and other behaviour of others to our own propositions or meaningful 
sentences. Knowledge of our minds and knowledge of the minds of 
others are thus mutually dependent (Davidson, 1991: 213).
6.
at this Point, we already have imPortant clues to understand Davidson’s 
externalism. On the one hand, Davidson justifies the individuation of the 
mental with reference to external factors because our mental contents and 
states are caused in some sense by those factors. I am in relation to my 
community and to the world in a way that those relations provide externality 
to my mind. On the other hand, the individuation of the mental with 
reference to external factors is justified because the mind is constituted by 
knowledge, a mental state that by itself could not lack an external aspect7.
7 Williamson (2000) indicates that part of the resistance to externalism lies in the insistence 
of defining knowledge. According to Williamson, knowledge should not be considered as 
the result of the articulation between something internal (belief) and something external 
(truth) through justification. The very notions of beliefs and justification depend for their 
intelligibility on the notion of knowledge. Although Davidson defends that we are knowers, 
it is not clear whether Davidson would accept Williamson’s approach on knowledge.
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This double aspect of Davidson’s position suggests two levels of 
explications about the externality of the mind8, which could be characterized 
respectively by the following conditions:
EC1 (explanatory condition 1): mental states and mental contents 
must be individuated in part by external factors to one’s skin because 
the former were caused by the latter.
EC2 (explanatory condition 2): mental states and mental contents 
must be individuated in part by external factors to one’s skin because 
the mind is constituted by knowledge.
Those explanatory conditions seem to refer to matters so distinct from 
each other that they deserve to be treated separately. On one level, the 
mind has an external character because we’ve been in causal relations with 
the world and with the community, while on the other level the mind is 
not self-contained because it is necessarily composed by knowledge. Both 
conditions constitute Davidsonian externalism, but it is useful to recognize 
that EC1 provides an extrinsic relation between mind and world while EC2 
gives space to an intrinsic one9.
In the previous sections we have seen that our interpretation activities 
only stand in the presence of knowledge. Davidson’s rejection of the third 
dogma involves an important aspect of our communicative activities that is 
the intrinsic connection between world visions and the world itself. There 
is no way to give sense to the idea of an “alternative conceptual scheme” 
because once we recognize someone as having a conceptual scheme (or, 
to avoid the jargon, as being a conceptual creature) we are inevitably 
attributing to her, and so sharing with her, meanings and beliefs at once. 
There is no sense in considering her as an intentional being, and still regard 
8 We are deliberately not considering the division between “social externalism” and 
“perceptual externalism”, suggested by Davidson (2001), as an important trait of his 
externalism, since it’s clear that Davidson insists on the necessity of the community and 
of the world. We are inclined to think that such a division is superficial and disguises the 
relevant differences between externalisms.
9 Davidson recognizes that externalism is an alternative to subjectivism when it “makes the 
connection between thought and the world intrinsic rather than extrinsic – a connection not 
inferred, constructed, or discovered, but there from the start” (Davidson, 2001: 2).
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her as an unintelligible speaker in principle10. One cannot understand my 
beliefs and simultaneously believe that all of them are false. Besides sharing 
beliefs, Davidson concludes that most of such beliefs should be indeed 
true. Knowledge is so identified as a necessary condition for interpretation.
Davidson (1991) stresses that knowledge of the world is necessary, but 
so are knowledge of other minds and self-knowledge. The interdependence 
between these three kinds of knowledge is another important condition 
defended by Davidson. But one may ask at this point: if the mental is conceived 
as necessarily composed by knowledge, why insist in extra conditions to justify 
the external character of the mind? If our interpretation activities are evidence 
of our having knowledge, it seems that such a fact would be enough to explain 
the external character of the mind. Once we take such a step there is no way 
back to conceive the mind as detached from the world.
Davidson clearly defends both levels of explications and more than 
that, he seems to indicate that EC2 is subsidiary of EC1. In the Davidsonian 
picture, that the mind is necessarily constituted by a good portion of 
knowledge seems to respond to the idea that we are embedded in causal 
relations11: the objectivity of the mind emerges from the triangulation 
conceived as composed by causal relations. One way of interpreting 
Davidson’s insistence on such an aspect is seeing it as a grounding of the 
epistemological and semantic features of his position on a metaphysics 
that is coherent with his commitment to physical monism. In this sense, 
causal relations can be read as stressing the fact that all the events can 
be considered are physical ones: that’s why the triangular relations are 
ultimately causal. And even if Davidson has always made clear that causal 
relations do not bear semantic content, it may not be so simple to render 
triangulation intelligible, as presenting the explanatory role it has, once 
one insists that such an ontology of purely causal physical events makes 
some features of mind and meaning quite mysterious12.
10 She may turn out to be unintelligible for other reasons, which include, for example, some 
kinds of disease, but she cannot be unintelligible because of the contents of her beliefs or 
the meanings of her words. See Davidson (1973).
11 It seems that both explanatory lines could be sustained separately. Williamson 
(2000) offers us an example of such a possibility when he considers knowledge as 
being a mental state which is prior conceptual and metaphysically to the one of belief.
12 Consider, for instance, what Chalmers (1995) coined as “the hard problem of consciousness”.
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7. 
BUt, what does Prevent Us from conceiving swamPman as an open 
possibility within Davidson’s externalism? We have refused to take such an 
experiment as the representative case of Davidson’s externalism because 
amongst other things Davidson himself has claimed that it is not a good 
example of it. However, it was also indicated that more than being a non-
representative case, Swampman expresses an important internal tension 
within Davidson’s framework.  
The Davidsonian solution to the mind-body problem –his so called 
“anomalous monism”- is a position that respects the following principles:
i. Principle of Causal Interaction: “at least some mental events 
interact causally with physical events” (Davidson, 1970: 208).
ii. Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality: 
“where there is causality, there must be a law: events related 
as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws” 
(Davidson, 1970: 208).
iii. Anomalism of the mental: “there are no strict deterministic 
laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted 
and explained” (Davidson, 1970: 208).
Although such principles could be considered as controversial when 
held together, Davidson defends that there is a way of maintaining all of them 
simultaneously by embracing anomalous monism. Amongst the theses involved 
by such a position there is one regarding individuation, according to which an 
event is individuated with respect to its causes and its effects (Davidson, 1969); 
and also one establishing that it is possible to talk about causes and effects using 
a physical vocabulary as well a mental one (Davidson, 1963). 
Davidson maintains the monism about events by stating that there are 
not two classes of events, one physical and the other mental. Instead, there 
is just one kind of events that could have two descriptions, one physical 
and another mental. He stresses that every mental event has a physical 
description but not the other way round. Davidson sustains a Humean 
notion of causality which allows him to retain the discourse about laws, 
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but at the level of events, not of its descriptions. Davidson’s central idea 
is that causal relations are established between events, independently of 
their descriptions, although a nomological law could only appear under 
a physical description. Such a position entails that a mental event could 
be described physically, and then could be part of causal relations even if 
the idea of psycho-physical laws is rejected (Davidson, 1967). This way, 
Davidson maintains the anomalous character of the mental while he is able 
to sustain the identity between physical and mental states.
The Swampman experiment is not disconnected from this part of 
Davidson’s philosophy. In the same context where he proposes Swampman, 
he indicates that one of the reasons why people consider it so difficult to 
conceive psychological states as external ones lies in the fact that nobody 
has countenanced an approach like “anomalous monism”. According to 
Davidson, once it is possible to talk about psychological states within the 
sphere of causality, the supposed problem seems to be solved. Considering 
that Swampman has no causal history, neither physical nor mental, and 
considering that any mental state that pertains to the real Davidson is 
part of a causal net that the replica lacks, their minds must be completely 
different (assuming it makes sense to speak of Swampman’s ‘mind’).
At this moment, it seems clear that nothing intrinsic to this discourse 
poses any problem to the viability of a creature such as Swampman being 
taken in our linguistic practices. And we are back to the tension initially 
indicated by the text. Our impression is that if the second explanatory level 
of externalism -that which refers to the constitution of mind by knowledge- 
is subsidiary of the first one, EC2 arrives too late to disallow the conception 
of a creature such as Swampman, mainly because in interpreting its 
utterances, part of what one has to concede is that those words were 
learned in the presence of causal relations. And if such a creature lacks 
those relations, and still presents all that is required to count as a minded 
being, it will certainly be attributed with propositional thought. There’s 
no way of checking embeddedness in causal relations in past history of 
learned language. And the point is that checking embeddedness is certainly 
not part of the history.
EC2 is the externalist explanatory condition which maintains that 
“mental states and contents must be individuated by external factors because 
the mind is constituted by knowledge”. It was suggested that such a level of 
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explanation is able to give space to an intrinsic relation between mind and 
world, since knowledge is a sort of mental state that could not be conceived 
as detached itself from the world. Nevertheless, Davidson seems to suggest 
that EC2 is dependent of another level of explanation, EC1. 
EC1 states that mental states and contents are caused by external 
factors and, because of that, the former must be individuated by the latter. 
This provides an external character to the mind due an extrinsic relation 
between mind and world. EC2 is related to EC1 in the sense that EC1 is 
more fundamental than EC2, at least from a metaphysical point of view. 
That the mind has knowledge within its constituents is a result of causal 
relations between an individual, her community and the world. Only in a 
second stage interpretation seems to come into the scene. In that sense, 
when Swampman is finally taken to be an unintelligible creature, he was 
already there; he has been interpreted and has interacted with our fellows, 
even lacking a mind. Needless to say that scepticism concerning other 
minds does not get blocked in this explanatory strategy, what would require 
turning it upside down, and giving priority to EC2. In fact, that seems 
to be Davidson’s position after having regretted the thought experiment: 
from the fact that mind is constituted by knowledge, it is possible to infer 
that language was learned in the presence of causal relations. This sort of 
movement may assure the rejection of positions such as the ones defending 
that “the views generally called ‘externalist’ do not form a particularly 
interestingly interconnected family of theses” (Hahn, 2003: 29). Locating 
Davidson’s commitments to externalism, as we pursued to do, had in view 
precisely presenting a picture of why Davidson could so clearly emphasize 
that “what I think is certain is that holism, externalism, and the normative 
feature of the mental stand or fall together” (Davidson, 1995: 122).
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